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European governments are poised to ban neonicotinoid pesticides. Insights from six 
years as a senior government advisor have led me to conclude that agricultural 
reform is urgently needed, beyond cycles of pesticide licensing and withdrawal.  
 
Pesticides come and go. Since the introduction of organochlorines, like DDT and 
dieldrin, in the 1940s, successive classes of chemical pesticides have been licensed 
for agricultural use and then been withdrawn from use as unexpected environmental 
or health impacts have appeared. This is now a familiar cycle and neonicotinoids are 
the current incarnation of this pattern. As chief scientific adviser to the United 
Kingdom’s Department of Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), I have 
observed aspects of the neonicotinoid story that are instructional for future pesticide 
management and for the science-policy interface in general. 
New pesticides are typically licenced for use based on guidance written on the label 
of the container. This guidance is constructed from efficacy and safety testing 
conducted in specific circumstances but which cannot simulate all the conditions 
encountered by users. As demand for a new pesticide increases, growers develop 
farming systems and business structures that rely on it. But as unanticipated impacts 
and pest resistance begin to appear, community opposition to the pesticide grows, 
chemical companies scramble to develop ‘less harmful’ variants, and governments 
struggle to balance their obligations to food production and environmental 
responsibility. As the evidence base against the pesticide grows, governments 
withdraw licences for use, and growers are left to pick up the pieces. 
This cyclical pattern applies the world over and is driven by two opposing 
mythologies. The first is that agricultural productivity will collapse without using 
pesticides at current levels1. If this is true it is because we have designed agriculture 
around these pesticides such that productivity relies on their presence, but it does 
not need to be like this. Pesticides are often over-used1 and the quest for yield 
maximisation ignores the fact that food production is highly inefficient2 and wasteful3. 
We also fail to fully exploit our knowledge of plant genetics, which could reduce 
pesticide reliance, and we are half-hearted in implementing innovative solutions that 
require no pesticides, such as vertical farming where crops can be grown in a 
biosecure environment.  
The second myth is that banning pesticides solves the problem. But historically, 
banning a pesticide class has typically created incentives to substitute a known 
problem with a set of new problems that take around 20 years to appear and be 
banned in turn. Here, I would like to shed light on the recent decision to further 
restrict neonicotinoid use in the UK. 
Government science advisers are mostly involved in areas of science where there is 
a lot of uncertainty and this is typified by the issue of neonicotinoids. The UK 
government ministers always said they would be guided by the science about 
neonicotinoids. This was a bold statement. There are several problems associated 
with making science the sole guide to policy3, one of which is that it can encourage 
people with a particular agenda, either overtly expressed or subliminal, to produce 
research biased towards their preferred outcome. 
I saw this happen throughout the neonicotinoid story. Some studies referred to as 
“landmark” by the press were statistically underpowered and socially over-sold; 
confirmation bias was sometimes blatantly obvious and sometimes heavily veiled. 
Most studies failed to address the key question the government needed answered, 
which was whether neonicotinoids had a significant effect on non-target insects, 
especially bees, at the level of whole populations.  
This may be an impossible question to answer and proxies of these effects might 
have to suffice. But the awkward truth about studies of the effects of neonicotinoids 
is that there has been an inverse relationship between statistical power and the 
relevance of the results to the key question4. Near-realistic field-based studies 
produced mixed and generally inconclusive results, and low levels of statistical 
significance rendered them largely uninformative. The results of lab studies were 
quite clear, but they did little more than confirm that neonicotinoid insecticides were 
poisonous to insects. Thus, much of the direct evidence produced did not help with 
making a policy decision. 
Similar criticisms could be levelled at the regulatory studies used to support the 
licencing of neonicotinoids as pesticides. These studies were not open to scrutiny 
and I was never given access to them. The drive to avoid multiple jeopardy and to 
protect commercial confidentiality does nothing to promote transparency and trust in 
the regulatory system. Possibly as a result of this, I also saw that the agri-chemical 
and farming industries appeared to misunderstand the duty they have to promote 
transparency in how they supply and use pesticides. Too often, it seemed that, to 
them, the function of regulation was to protect their business interests rather than to 
deliver public goods. 
Regulation does not work unless it is trusted. I suggest that the progressive increase 
in pesticide prohibition is symbolic of increasing distrust in current pesticide 
regulation. The rising tide of evidence, irrespective of its quality, also reflects this 
loss of trust.  
My view about neonicotinoids ultimately hinged on two key pieces of evidence. The 
first of these was almost incidental: neonicotinoids were appearing in places where 
they should never have been found. For example, field experiments could not be 
conducted properly because control plots often turned out to be contaminated. This 
pervasiveness amounted to evidence for much longer soil residence times and intra-
soil transport than had been assumed. My own modelling of dose rates with different 
plausible half-lives of neonicotinoids in soils showed a high probability that there 
could be accumulation in soils. 
The second line of evidence came from unpublished data showing that 
neonicotinoids had a significant positive effect on yields but that this effect was small 
compared with overall yield variability. I thought this was a very strange result. If this 
had been presented as evidence of efficacy then it would not have passed muster. I 
suspected that the controls in this case were also contaminated. 
In such situations, no piece of evidence on its own is ever decisive, but there was a 
pattern developing. There had been increasing use of neonicotinoids in Britain since 
2000. They were being used widely throughout the arable cereal industry and in 
some specialist crops like carrots, parsnips and sugar beet, not just on flowering 
crops like oilseed. The evidence was suggesting that the countryside was, in effect, 
being heavily dosed using prophylactic neonicotinoid seed dressings. Even farmers 
who chose not to use neonicotinoids, such as those farming organically, were likely 
to be benefitting because of this landscape-scale dosing. In addition, withdrawing 
neonicotinoids from use on flowering break crops like oilseed in 2013 may have had 
little protective effect for pollinators because the same fields were being used to 
grow cereals treated with neonicotinoids within the crop rotation cycle. 
Of course, this was a hypothesis rather than a definitive, evidence-based story. 
Reliable data on soil accumulation was almost non-existent (or buried in inaccessible 
dossiers used to gain a licence for use), but the data on use rates was very clear. 
The Environment Agency had also begun to measure neonicotinoids at monitoring 
sites and were finding their presence sometimes in surprising places. If they were so 
pervasive and widespread then what were their indirect, diffuse effects on insect and 
soil invertebrate faunas? We had no idea. 
My advice became that neonicotinoids were probably being used on scales outside 
the scope of their licence. Even if every individual farmer was using neonicotinoids 
according to the regulations, those regulations did not account for how many farmers 
were using them or how often they were being used.  
Ultimately, government must attempt to balance concerns for the farming industry, 
food prices and the competitive edge of UK food production in global markets, with 
the effects of environmental damage. Neonicotinoids are an important chemical 
technology if used intelligently and sparingly and if this balance of risk is taken in to 
account. But the regulatory process tends to be a blunt instrument which is blunted 
further when given a political spin. We need to dampen down the wild swings 
between using chemicals like neonicotinoids almost without constraint on the one 
hand and banning their use altogether on the other hand. Neither is sensible. This 
calls for a much more evidence-driven, risk-based way of regulating the use of 
pesticides5. 
However, a lesson for the scientific research community is that swathes of carefully 
controlled, peer-reviewed evidence 5,6 is often uninfluential if it is not focussed on the 
key question which policy-makers seek to answer. Defining this question is critical to 
avoiding wasted effort. What may appear a sensible biological question will not 
always seem so sensible when confronted with the operational realities of regulation 
and the law3. 
It remains possible that neonicotinoids are relatively benign and the risks from their 
use are proportionate to the benefits they provide. Uncertainty will always be a 
problem when making judgements about diffuse environmental impacts, but we can 
be much more certain about the fact that these diffuse effects are part of a farming 
system which needs overhaul and thorough reform. If further restricting, but not 
banning, neonicotinoids encourages genuine innovation and stops the next cycle of 
chemical abuse of the environment, then progress will have been made. 
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Figure 1 | Evidence points to the presence of neonicotinoid pesticides across the UK 
landscape, vastly exceeding target areas. [Photo caption ok?] 
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